The foundation of the trust stack: decentralized identifiers (DIDs), key management, and verifiable data registries (VDRs). This infrastructure supports self-sovereign identity, helping participants control their own identifiers and keys and providing verification material for higher layers.
Layer 1 supplies identifier and key infrastructure. It helps a verifier obtain the material needed to check a signature and lets a participant demonstrate identifier control. That control does not, by itself, establish who the participant is in the real world.
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) provide references to subjects under method-specific rules. A DID document can describe verification methods, authentication mechanisms, and service endpoints. It is not itself a profile or proof of real-world identity.
Layer 1 infrastructure includes:
The P2PTS has its own native path to Layer 1 functionality — no DNS, no external registry,
no ledger dependency. A DID-method-agnostic VidMethod interface decouples
identity from any one DID method, a minimal VTC/VRC primitive provides just enough
governance machinery to support a witness pool, and a hash-chained, pre-rotation key
rotation mechanism backed by a decentralized Witness VTC provides verifiable identity
rotation without relying on external infrastructure.
This is implemented and tested today, and ships as part of the open source v0.2.0 release — see Native Identity & Rotation below for details.
✅ Complete
The P2PTS solves DID rotation with the same decentralized building blocks the rest of the
stack already uses: a method-agnostic
identity interface, a minimal governance primitive, and libp2p-native peer relationships. Multiple
completed implementations carry this from a fixed did:peer:4 identity all the way to a
rotating, witness-attested did:scid:vh identity.
VidMethod Abstraction ✅ Complete
A DID-method-agnostic interface (create(), resolve(), verify())
that Agent and RelationshipManager depend on instead of calling
method-specific functions directly. did:scid:vh is wrapped as ScidVhMethod,
did:peer:4 as DidPeer4Method — interchangeable identity backends.
Just enough of Layer 3 to unblock Layer 1: a VTC identity with an admin list, an implementation-specific
Vrc record type with an M-of-N co-signed signature
bundle, and createVtc() / issueVrc() / verifyVrc() —
governance logic lives in a policy document, not in new cryptographic primitives. This implementation
primitive is distinct from the reciprocal VRC edge definition in Working Draft 0.6.0.
RotatingVidMethod — a second VidMethod implementation with real key
rotation. Each rotation pre-commits to the next key (pre-rotation) and is attested by M-of-N
members of a decentralized Witness VTC (the same minimal VTC/VRC primitive above), replacing
DNS watchers with a libp2p-native, opt-in community of witnesses.
Different DID methods make different tradeoffs between decentralization, offline capability,
and infrastructure requirements. The website documents did:scid:vh and did:peer:4.
Method selection depends on identifier lifetime, rotation needs, and deployment assumptions.
A self-certifying DID method that carries its own cryptographic proof of provenance via a hash-chained verifiable history. No external ledger dependency is described; verification still requires the relevant history and verification material. Supports built-in key pre-rotation and witness attestation via a decentralized Witness VTC. Documented for long-lived identifiers in the P2PTS.
Tradeoff: Long identifiers; requires at least one Witness VTC to exist
(a documented "genesis" Witness VTC is shipped for development). Rotation-aware code depends
on the VidMethod interface for interchangeability.
A self-certifying DID method where the DID document is embedded in the identifier itself. No network lookup required — resolution and verification are fully offline. Available for quick development and testing scenarios where key rotation is not needed.
Tradeoff: Long identifiers; no key rotation (a new DID must be created for each identity). Ideal for ephemeral identities and peer-to-peer development.
A participant can demonstrate control of an identifier using the applicable cryptographic mechanisms. Claims about a person, organization, or device require additional evidence and application judgment. Key compromise, recovery procedures, and reliance on issuers remain relevant security concerns.
A DID document can describe verification methods, authentication mechanisms, and service endpoints. The applicable verification relationship determines how a key is used for a particular check. The document is not itself a profile or proof of the subject’s real-world identity.
Key rotation replaces an old key with a successor. Pre-rotation commits to a successor key before the update, so verifiers can check a proposed rotation against that commitment. Its protection depends on the method’s verification rules, available history, key custody, and any witness requirements.
A witness observes and attests to DID document updates. Signed, hash-linked history can make changes detectable to verifiers applying the method’s rules. The documented rotation mechanism uses M-of-N attestations from a Witness VTC; those attestations do not establish the subject’s real-world identity.